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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
The court leaves open the question of whether the statute con-
templates only a previous conviction of a felony under the law of
West Virginia, or is all-embracing of felonies under any law. A
further question remains whether a sentence by court-martial to
the 'United States penitentiary instead of to confinement in the
Disciplinary Barracks would have met the requirements of our
statute, which only requires a previous conviction of a crime punish-
able in a penitentiary.
M. S. K.
DEDS - CONSTRUCTION AS TO GRANTEES - OFFICIAL oR REPRE-
SENTATIVE CAPACITY.- , as receiver of the X National Bank, sold
several tracts of land to B at a public sale. B later refused the con-
veyance on the ground that A had no title to the land sold. The
property had been purchased by A's predecessor in office at a sale
to enforce the bank's lien thereon, the conveyance having been made
to "C, Receiver of the X National Bank, an insolvent national bank-
ing association." B demurred to A's bill for specific performance.
Held, that such a deed conveys the land to the grantee in his in-
dividual capacity, and "Receiver of the X National Bank", etc., is
only descriptio personae. Hardesty v., Fairmont Supply Co.,
The court announced that it was merely following the rule laid
down in Dona7hue v. Rafferty and Hyman v. Swint,' two earlier
West Virginia cases. The former decision did not specifically con-
cern the construction of a deed, but of certain other papers; yet it
was held therein that the designation "Rt. Rev. P. J. Donahue,
Bishop of Wheeling" was not inconsistent with a fee in Donahue
personally. Hyinan v. Swint arose on a demurrer, the actual hold-
ing being that there was nothing in a conveyance to the "Rt. Rev.
P. J. Donahue, Bishop of Wheeling" which contradicted the aver-
ment in the bill that Donahue held title to the property in his in-
dividual capacity. However, the general statement was made that
"where property is conveyed to one whose name in the deed is fol-
lowed simply by his title or name in office, the legal title vests in
him individually."" This generalization may not have been war-
ranted by either the facts or the holding in that particular litiga-
tion.4
'14 S. E. (2d) 436 (W. Va. 1941).
2Donahue v. Rafferty, 82 W. Va. 535, 96 S. E. 935 (1918); Hyman v. Swint,
94 W. Va. 627, 119 S. E. 866 (1923).
3 94 W. Va. at 633.
4 In Rinehart v. Ireland, 120 W. Va. 599, 199 S. E. 871 (1938), the result
appears to be that a conveyance to " .A. Rinehart, Reciver of Y County
1
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While the Hyman case held that a deed to the "Rt. Rev. P.
J. Donahue, Bishop of Wheeling" may have conveyed to Donahue
individually, the court in the present case holds that a conveyance
to "0, receiver of the X National Bank", etc., can convey to the
grantee in an individual capacity only.. In arriving at this con-
clusion, the court may have been unnecessarily influenced by the
generalization in the Hyman case. "Words designating the repre-
sentative or official capacity of the grantee may be only descriptio
personae and will be construed accordingly, unless it can be infer-
red to the contrary from the instrument, especially where there is
an absence of all proof tending to show the existence of a trust
estate, and there is none created by the deed.'5 Can it not be in-
ferred from the words "Receiver of the X National Bank", etc.,
that they are intended to be more than merely descriptive?'
Furthermore, the instant case now determines that a conveyance
to "C, Receiver of the X National Bank", etc., is plain and unam-
biguous, and that parol testimony is not admissible to show the
capacity in which the grantee took the land. Heretofore, such a
deed would have been susceptible of two reasonable interpretations
as to the capacity in which the grantee took and evidence would
have been admissible to show the capacity intended.
7
Bank" conveyed to Rinehart in his official capacity, though the point was not
specifically mentioned.
518 C. J. Deeds, § 240.
6 Johnson v. Calnan, 19 Colo. 168, 34 Pac. 905 (1893) ("trustee" after the
name of the grantee more than deseriptio personae, and parol evidence ad-
missible); Troy & N. C. Gold Mining Co. v. Snow Lumber Co., 170 N. C. 273,
87 S. E. 40 (1915) (conveyance to "T, trustee of X corporation" conveyed
to T as trustee; Hart v. Seymour, 147 I1. 598, 35 N. E. 246 (1893) (conveyance
to "T, trustee of Z association" prima face conveyed absolute title to
grantee). Of. Andrew v. City-Commercial Savings Bank, 205 Iowa 42, 217 N.
W. 431 (1928).
The existence of much of the authority contra may be explained by (1)
the incapacity of the purported beneficiary to take and hold title, Fowler v.
Coates, 201 N. Y. 257, 94 N. E. 997 (1911) ; Towar v. Hale, 46 Barb. Ch. 361
(N. Y. 1866); (2) or the failure of the instrument to disclose the principle,
Love v. Love, 72 Kan. 658, 83 Pac. 201 (1905) ; Jackson v. Roberts, 95 Ky. 410,
25 S. W. 879 (1894); Greenwood L. & P. J. R. R. v. New York & G. L. R. R.,
134 N. Y. 435, 31 N. E. 874 (1892); Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Fallon,
301 App. Div. 187, 91 N. Y. Supp. 497 (1905) ; (3) or the use of "heirs and
assigns" rather than "successors and assigns" in the habendum clause, Towar
v. Hale, 46 Barb. Ch. 361 (N. Y. 1866); Van Schaick v. Lese, 31 Misc. 610,
66 N. Y. Supp. 64 (1900).
rThe Hyman case was to the effect that if the trust relationship had been
averred and established in Donahue, then he would not have held title in-
dividually, but in trust for his diocese. MEEEM, PUBLIC OFFICES AD O'-
oERs (1890) 615. There is a presumption that public officers and agents
intend to bind the public in their official dealings with third parties. The re-
ceiver of a national bank is an officer, of the United States. Kennedy v. Gib-
son, 8 Wa]l. 498, 19 L. Ed. 476 (U. S. 1869); United States v. 'Weitzel, 246
U. S. 533, 38 S.Ct. 381, 62 L. Ed. 872 (1918).
2
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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
The Hymnan case left such a deed presumptively a conveyance
to the grantee individually, though this presumption might be des-
troyed by proof of a fiduciary relationship.8 The present case holds
that such a deed can mean only one thing, and outside evidence
cannot change this.' Thus, the presumption in the Hyman case has
become conclusive.
D. C. H.
INSURANCE - RETENTION o PREMIUMS AFTER Loss - NON-
EXISTENCE OF PERSON QUALImED TO RECEIVE PAYMENT. - P in-
surance company issued to A its national standard automobile
liability policy. A paid the premiums for one year, and four months
later died intestate. The policy terms permitted assignment, if
written notice were given within thirty days after the death of the
named insured, to cover (a) his legal representative, and (b) any
person having proper temporary custody of the automobile as in-
sured until appointment and qualification of such legal represent-
ative, but in no event for a period of more than thirty days after
such death. Written notice of A's death was given but no legal
representative for A's estate was appointed for more than two
months after A's death. B received injuries while riding in A's
car more than two months after A's death and filed suit against
A's estate. Thereupon P paid the unearned balance of the premium
into court and brought this action for a declaratory judgment.
Held, that the delay and retention of the unearned balance of the
premium affected no waiver of the condition subsequent; therefore
the policy was terminated. New Century Casualty Co. v. Chase.'
If the insurer learns of a ground of forfeiture other than the
nonpayment of premiums before a loss occurs, it seems that it
must notify the insured within a reasonable time, under penalty
of being held to have waived its forfeiture rights,2 on the ground
8 SyL 1: 11A deed made to the 'Right Reverend P. J. Donahoe (sic], Bishop
of Wheeling", conveying to him land .. . vests in P. J. Dohahoe [sic in-
dividually the legal and equitable title thereto, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary." Accord: Hart v. Seymour, 147 Ill. 598, 35 N. E. 246 (1893).
9 The unusually strict construction which the common law placed on sealed
instruments should not apply today in West Virginia where the seal has be-
come unnecessary in the execution of a deed. W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c.
36, art. 3, § 1.
1 39 F. Supp. 768 (S. D. W. Va. 1941).
2 Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Dallavo, 274 Fed. 258 (C. C. A. 6th, 1921)
(insurance company waived forfeiture where company had notice of breach of
condition long before the loss, but retained premiums and left policy outstand-
ing) ; Southern States Fire Ins. Co. v. Kronenberg, 199 Ala. 164, 74 So. 63
(1917) (where fire company before loss is notified of forfeiture or breach of
3
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